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Negotiating the Climate Away - West Coast Environmental Law
| Negotiating the Climate Away: Report Card on
Environmental Integrity of OECD Nations Climate Summit Negotiation Positions
November 2000

Chris Rolfe, Staff Counsel
Linda Nowlan, Acting Executive Director
West Coast Environmental Law
|
| EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Until November 24, 2000 the nations of the world
are meeting in den Hague, Netherlands, to negotiate the rules under which they will reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol assigned to each of the worlds
developed countries a maximum amount of greenhouse gas emissions for the period 2008 to
2012. But it also allowed nations to trade their assigned amounts of allowable emissions,
to get credit for some greenhouse gases absorbed by forests and to get credit for emission
reductions in developing countries. The rules for these mechanisms were either cursory or
completely undecided. The Hague summit will finalize those rules.
There is a risk that many of the commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol will be
undermined by a series of loopholes. While these loopholes are often justified as
providing flexibility so that nations can achieve their greenhouse gas emission targets at
lower cost, in many cases they allow an increase in net global emissions of greenhouse
gases.
This report card evaluates the negotiating positions of the 27 nations that are members
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and signatories to
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. These are the worlds leading nations.
They are economically the most powerful and most developed, and they include most of the
largest per capita greenhouse gas emitters in the world.
Nations positions are evaluated on the basis of four loopholes. The four
loopholes are:
Overselling: Overselling is the risk that a nation
will sell parts of its assigned amount of allowable emissions that it needs to cover
actual emissions. If a nation oversells it assigned amount and another nation uses the
purchased assigned amount to increase emissions, global emissions increase. Nations score
points for suggesting mechanisms that either safeguard against oversells or ensure that
the purchasing nation has responsibility for ensuring that real reductions occur.
Hot Air: Hot air is the portion of a nations allowable emissions quota
that is excess to that nations business as usual emissions for the 2008 to 2012
period. Russia and a number of eastern European nations received an assigned amount under
the Kyoto Protocol that was intended to give them flexibility in rebuilding their
economies. However, it is now clear that even if these nations take no actions to reduce
emissions, the amount of allowable emissions assigned to them is far in excess of their
possible emissions in the 2008 to 2012 period. If they are allowed to trade this excess,
emissions trading will allow global emissions to increase. Nations score points for
suggesting mechanisms that either prohibit sales of hot air or reduce the amount of hot
air available.
Sinks: Sinks is the term given for forests, soils and other processes that
absorb (i.e. act as a sink for) carbon dioxide or other greenhouse gases. While forests
and soils can be sources, for the next several decades they are projected to be major net
sinks of greenhouse gases in almost all industrialized nations. If nations receive credit
for all the carbon absorbed by their forests, global greenhouse gas emissions increase.
Nations score points for opposing the addition of new sink categories under the Kyoto
Protocol and for suggesting mechanisms that eliminate or reduce the extent of credit for
carbon absorption that would have occurred anyway.
CDM Baselines: The Clean Development Mechanism is the mechanism by which
developed countries can receive credit for emission reductions occurring in developing
nations. Reductions are measured by comparing actual emissions with a baseline that
represents what emissions would have been in the absence of the CDM or the project. If
baselines are weak and credit given for reductions that would have occurred in the absence
of the project, or if credits are given for projects that would have occurred in the
absence of the CDM, the CDM will allow global greenhouse gas emissions to increase.
Nations score points for restricting the CDM to project types that are less likely to
occur anyway, criteria that screen out business as usual projects, supporting technical
guidelines on development of baselines and supporting stringent approaches to baselines.
These are not the only loopholes or the only environmental concerns with the Protocol,
but they have been chosen because of their clear potential to allow an increase in net
global greenhouse gas emissions.
Disclaimer
Parties are scored on the basis of submissions
available on the UNFCCC Secretariat website, negotiation interventions reported in Earth
Negotiations Bulletins and interventions observeded by the authors. In some cases
non-papers submitted by the Parties may not be reflected in the scores. Also the report
card is based on submissions up to the end of October, 2000. Recent changes in position,
or changes in position that have not been made public may not be reflected in the scores.
It is the sincere hope of the authors that the Parties with the lowest scores will alter
their stances at CoP6.
While the authors have attempted to be as objective as possible scoring positions is
ulimately subjective and dependant on interpretations. It is also sometimes dependant on
second hand observations. We apologize for any misinterpretations of Party positions.
Finally, the choice of loopholes influences Parties' scores. If compliance system
positions were considered it is likely that Australia and Japan would stand out for their
lack of support for binding consequences. If support for nuclear in the CDM were
considered, Canada, the US, Japan and, to a lesser extent, the UK and France would receive
low scores because of their support for nuclear.
For each of the four loopholes, nations receive a grade from 0/10 to 10/10. A score of
10/10 represents a position that is most likely to effectively eliminate the loophole. The
difference between the score and ten is then multiplied by a factor representing the
estimated size of the loophole (Thus weighting loopholes by their significance).
Since completion of this report, several Parties have shifted their positions. An
update is at the end of the report. Japan, Canada, US and New Zealand scores are adjusted.
The parties rated as having the worst, second worst and third worst climate negotiation
positions are Japan, Canada and the United States.
| RANK |
NATION |
TOTAL LOOPHOLE
MEGATONNES |
TOTAL SCORE
(MAXIMUM
SCORE = 40) |
|
| 1. |
Austria |
3,727 |
34 |
Most Climate Friendly |
| 2. |
Belgium |
3,727 |
34 |
| 3. |
Denmark |
3,727 |
34 |
| 4. |
Finland |
3,727 |
34 |

|
| 5. |
France |
3,727 |
34 |
| 6. |
Germany |
3,727 |
34 |
| 7. |
Greece |
3,727 |
34 |
| 8. |
Ireland |
3,727 |
34 |
|
| 9. |
Italy |
3,727 |
34 |
| 10. |
Luxembourg |
3,727 |
34 |
| 11. |
Netherlands |
3,727 |
34 |
| 12. |
Portugal |
3,727 |
34 |
| 13. |
Spain |
3,727 |
34 |
| 14. |
Sweden |
3,727 |
34 |
| 15. |
United Kingdom |
3,727 |
34 |
| 16. |
Korea |
8,492 |
37 |
| 17. |
Switzerland |
8,526 |
38 |
| 18. |
Poland |
9,302 |
22 |
| 19. |
Hungary |
12,314 |
18 |
| 20. |
Czech Republic |
12,014 |
19 |
| 21. |
Norway |
15,655 |
10 |
| 22. |
New Zealand |
18,905 |
7 |

|
| 23. |
United States |
19,388 |
9 |
| 24. |
Iceland |
19,988 |
6 |
| 25. |
Australia |
19,988 |
6 |
Least Climate Friendly |
| 26. |
Canada |
24,772 |
1.5 |
| 27. |
Japan |
24,922 |
1 |
INTRODUCTION The Kyoto Protocol assigned to each of the
worlds developed countries a maximum amount of greenhouse gas emissions for the
period 2008 to 2012. But it also allowed nations to trade their assigned amounts of
allowable emissions, to get credit for some greenhouse gases absorbed by forests and to
get credit for emission reductions in developing countries. The rules for these mechanisms
were either cursory or completely undecided.
Until November 24, 2000 the nations of the world are meeting in den Hague, Netherlands,
to finalize rules under which they will reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This climate
summit is the most important summit since 1997, when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated.
There is a risk that many of the commitments contained in the Kyoto Protocol will be
undermined by a series of loopholes. While these loopholes are often justified as
providing flexibility so that nations can achieve their greenhouse gas emission targets at
lower cost, in many cases they allow an increase in global emissions of greenhouse gases,
undermining the purpose of the Kyoto Protocol.
This report card evaluates the negotiating positions of the 27 nations that are members
of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and signatories to
the Framework Convention on Climate Change. These are the worlds leading nations.
They are economically the most powerful and most developed, and they include most of the
largest per capita greenhouse gas emitters in the world.
The next section gives background to the basics of the Kyoto Protocol. The section
after that introduces the four loopholes and the process for scoring them. The final
section discusses each of the loopholes and scores each of the Parties positions.
BACKGROUND
| THE NEGOTIATING BLOCS The negotiations are dominated by several groupings of nations.
These include:
The Umbrella Group. Canada, the US, Russia,
Australia, Norway, New Zealand and Iceland all belong to the Umbrella Group. The Umbrella
Group has been the leading proponent of flexibility in the negotiations. Umbrella Group
positions have been criticised as favouring flexibility over environmental integrity.
The European Union. The European Union is generally
seen as a greater champion of environmental integrity than the Umbrella Group. However,
its positions on some issues are weak, certain positions are poorly developed and it is
not clear the extent to which EU positions reflect positioning for domestic consumption as
opposed to strong commitments.
G-77/China. Along with the Umbrella Group and EU,
the G-77/China is the third main negotiating bloc. Its members include groups with diverse
interests, ranging from The Association of Small Island States (AOSIS) to Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), united by their common interest in developing
country issues such as technology transfer and funding for adaptation.
AOSIS. The Association of Small Island States. With
members whose survival is endangered by sea level rise, AOSIS has taken strong
environmental stance on many issues.
Environmental Integrity Group. Switzerland, Mexico
and Korea. This group has distinguished itself as consistently developing positions that
are environmentally defensible, while recognising the need for flexibility. |
Before proceeding with the Report Card, this section provide
readers with some context about the Framework Convention on Climate Change or the Kyoto
Protocol. Decisions made in previous agreements define what is being negotiated at the
climate summit in the Hague officially known as the 6th Conference of
the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change or "CoP6".
The Framework Convention
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (FCCC) was one of several key environmental treaties negotiated at the June 1992
Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Almost 160 nations have ratified the FCCC to date.
These nations are referred to as "Parties". The ultimate objective of the FCCC
is to achieve "stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a
level that will prevent dangerous anthropogenic [human-induced] interference with the
climate system". Parties listed in Annex I to the FCCC essentially the
industrialized world are to adopt policies and measures with the aim of returning
emissions to their 1990 levels by 2000.
As its name implies, the FCCC is a framework of general principles and institutions. It
sets up a process for developing more meaningful commitments. In 1995 it was recognized
that the commitments in the FCCC were inadequate to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate
change. This lead to the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (the "Kyoto Protocol") contains
legally binding emission reduction commitments for developed nations. The following
are the major components of the Kyoto Protocol.
Commitment Periods and Assigned Amounts
Article 3 of the Protocol establishes a commitment
period between 2008 and 2012 (the "First Commitment Period") during which the
developed countries listed in Annex B (the "Annex B Parties") must limit their
emissions. Parties are assigned an amount of allowable emissions (the "assigned
amount") that is based on a certain percentage of emissions in a base year. For most
purposes, the base year is 1990. Canadas assigned amount is 94% of 1990 emissions
times five (to reflect the five years in the First Commitment Period). The US assigned
amount is 93% of base year emissions times five; the European Unions is 92%. The
Russian Federation is only required to stabilise emissions. Iceland is allowed to increase
emissions by up to ten percent.
Emissions Trading and the Flexibility Mechanisms
The Kyoto Protocol establishes four mechanisms, all of
which involve some form of emissions trading (although only one mechanism is called
emissions trading in the Protocol). Under emission trading programs, polluters (whether
they are a nation or a company) are given flexibility in how to reduce their emissions.
Where an emitter can, at a low or negative cost, reduce emissions beyond what is required
by law they can sell or transfer an emission reduction credit or an emission allowance to
polluters who cannot reduce their emissions as easily. The Party acquiring the credit or
allowance is then allowed to emit more. Trading itself is not intended to reduce
emissions; it is intended to reduce the cost of meeting an emission limit defined by
international or domestic law. Without trading, emission limits may be impractical or not
enforced. On the other hand, loopholes or weaknesses in trading systems may allow global
emissions to increase over what would occur in the absence of trading. The four mechanisms
established by the Kyoto Protocol are: international emissions trading, joint
implementation, the clean development mechanism and joint fulfilment
International Emissions Trading
Article 17 states that the CoP will define the
"principles, modalities, rules and guidelines" for emissions trading and that
Annex B Parties can participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their
commitments. Article 3 states that parts of Parties assigned amounts will be added
or subtracted when Parties trade under Article 17. Beyond this, the rules of emissions
trading are undefined. The units traded under emissions trading are referred to as
assigned amount units ("AAUs").
Clean Development Mechanism
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol establishes the clean
development mechanism ("CDM"). At its most basic, the CDM establishes a
process for generating emission reduction credits in developing countries (non-Annex B
Parties). The Annex B Parties can use these credits officially know as certified
emission reductions or "CERs" to increase their domestic emissions.
Projects that qualify for the CDM generate CERs by reducing emissions below a baseline
that represents the level of emissions that would have occurred in the absence of the
project or absence of the CDM. The CDM is also supposed to help developing countries
achieve sustainable development.
Joint Implementation
Under Article 6, Annex B Parties can transfer and
acquire emission reduction units ("ERUs"). When ERUs are purchased, they are
added to the purchasing nations assigned amount and subtracted from the assigned
amount of the nation transferring them. The main distinction between JI and trading is
that under JI, ERUs represent reductions from a specific project while in emissions
trading AAUs are not associated with a particular project.
Joint Fulfillment the EU Bubble
Article 4 allows parties to agree to fulfil their
commitments jointly. It provides that if Parties have agreed to joint fulfilment, they
will be deemed to have met commitments provided total emissions do not exceed the total
assigned amount for all Parties. The terms of the joint fulfilment agreement specify the
reallocation of assigned to the different Parties. Article 4 was negotiated with the
European Union in mind, and the 92% target for all EU nations was agreeable to certain
nations (e.g. Ireland, Portugal and Spain, all of whom have escalating emissions) on the
understanding that they would be reassigned a less stringent target.
Forest and Soil Sinks
The assigned amount of most countries is a percentage
of "gross" emissions in 1990. Gross emissions are anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gas emissions from energy, industrial processes, agriculture and waste. For
most parties, assigned amounts do not reflect whether forest, soils and other carbon
reservoirs are removing carbon from the atmosphere (i.e. acting as a sink) or acting as a
source of greenhouse gases.
However, when calculating whether a Party is in compliance with its Article 3 emission
limits, Parties are required to count some but not all carbon fluxes from forests. Under
Article 3.3, they are required to count emissions and removals from 2008 to 2012 resulting
from afforestation, reforestation, and deforestation since 1990. CoP6 may decide to add
other categories of forest and soil sinks under Article 3.4.
Six Gases
The Kyoto Protocol applies to six greenhouse gases: the
three main greenhouse gases released by human activity (carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and
methane) and one gas (sulphur hexafluoride) and two families of gases (hydrofluorocarbons
and perfluorocarbons) that are released in small quantities but are both long lasting and
extremely powerful.
Compliance
The Protocol is virtually silent on the issue of how to
ensure compliance. As a "placeholder" Article 18 states that a meeting of the
Parties to the Protocol is to approve procedures and mechanisms to determine and address
cases of non-compliance. Any mechanisms involving binding consequences are to be adopted
by amendment to the Protocol.
Coming into force
The Kyoto Protocol only comes into force when it is
ratified by a minimum of 55 Parties representing a minimum of 55% of Annex 1 emissions in
1990. So far none of the Annex 1 countries have ratified the treaty, although almost all
have signed it, indicating an intention to be bound in the future.
Buenos Aires Plan of Action
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action was adopted in the
final hours of the Fourth Conference of Parties (CoP4) in Buenos Aires, Argentina. It
established a time frame for Parties to resolve key issues associated with the FCCC and
the Kyoto Protocol. CoP6 was set as the deadline for making decisions on the mechanisms
(CDM, trading and joint implementation), treatment of sinks under Articles 3.3 and 3.4,
and assisting developing country Parties with adaptation to climate change (Articles 4.8
and 4.9 of the FCCC). Subsequently CoP6 was identified as a deadline for decisions
on compliance mechanisms.
S CORING METHODOLOGYParties' positions are
evaluated on the basis of four loopholes. The four loopholes are:
Overselling: Overselling is the risk that a nation
will sell assigned amount units that it needs to cover actual emissions. If a nation
oversells and another nation uses the purchased AAUs to increase emissions, global
emissions increase.
Hot Air: Hot air is the name of assigned amount
which is in excess to a nations business as usual emissions for the 2008 to 2012
period. Russia and a number of eastern European nations received an assigned amount
intended to give them flexibility in rebuilding their economies. However, it is now clear
that even if these nations take no actions to reduce emissions, the amount they received
under the Kyoto Protocol is far in excess of their possible emissions in the 2008 to 2012
period. If they are allowed to trade these excess AAUs, global emissions increase.
Sinks: While forests and soils can be sources (and
are projected to become sources in the future due to climate change), for the next decade
or two they are projected to be major net sinks of greenhouse gases in almost all
industrialized nations. If nations receive credit for all the carbon absorbed by their
forests, global greenhouse gas emissions increase.
CDM Baselines: If baselines are weak and credit
given for reductions that would have occurred anyway or for reductions that are not real,
the CDM will allow global greenhouse gas emissions to increase.
These loopholes were chosen because they represent clear examples of rules that run
contrary to the intent of the Protocol, by allowing an increase in global emissions. These
are not the only loopholes, nor the only issues of importance at CoP 6. A number of other
key issues are of equal importance. They include:
Compliance. Will the Kyoto Protocol have a
compliance system with sufficient rigour to ensure that Parties reduce their emissions on
schedule?
Supplementarity. Will industrialized nations be
required to achieve a percentage of their emission reductions through domestic action?
Permanence of Sinks. The worlds forests are
expected to become an increasing source of emissions as climate changes, reversing
removals achieved by sequestration. Will the Protocol recognize this fundamental
difference between emission reductions and sequestering carbon in forests, and will it
contain measures to ensure that sinks are not simply transferred onto future generations.
Uncertainty of Sink Measurement. Will the Protocol
reflect the high degree of uncertainty in measuring carbon absorption by forests? This
uncertainty is particularly problematic because of the significance of sinks and because
systemic errors are not balanced by the same error in baselines.
Promoting Unsustainable Activities. Will the
Protocol promote unsustainable activities such as nuclear, large hydro dams and coal?
Promoting long term solutions to climate change.
Will the Protocol promote activities in developing countries that are consistent with the
reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions to safe levels?
Funds for Adaptation. Will a mechanism be developed
which ensures that funds are available to adequately help developing countries adapt to
climate change caused by industrialized nations?
For each of the four loopholes on which Parties positions are graded, nations
receive a grade from 0/10 to 10/10. Zero out of ten represents a position that actively
supports a loophole. Ten out of ten represents a position that would effectively close the
loophole. The details regarding how points are scored for the different loopholes are
discussed with each loophole.
The difference between the score and ten is multiplied by a "potential loophole
rating" representing the estimated size of the loophole and its probability of
occurring. The result is "loophole megatonnes". To the extent Parties have
positions, to the extent the effectiveness of Parties positions can be estimated,
and to extent the size of a loophole can be estimated, loophole tonnes gives an
approximation of the amount of excess tonnes that would be allowed in the atmosphere if
the Parties position were adopted. The results are summarised in Table 2 below.
TABLE 2
NATION
/ISSUE |
OVERSELLING |
HOT AIR |
SINKS |
CDM BASELINES |
TOTAL
LOOPHOLE |
| |
Total
Mega-tonnes |
Total Score |
Total
Mega-tonnes |
Total Score |
Total
Mega-tonnes |
Total Score |
Total
Mega-tonnes |
Score
(Max.
= 10) |
Total
Mega-
tonnes |
Total
Score |
| EUROPEAN UNION |
| Austria |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Belgium |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Denmark |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Finland |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| France |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Germany |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Greece |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Ireland |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Italy |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Luxembourg |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Netherlands |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Portugal |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Spain |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| Sweden |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
| United Kingdom |
1,076 |
8 |
1,268 |
8 |
1,083 |
9 |
300 |
9 |
3,727 |
34 |
UMBRELLA GROUP |
| Australia |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
6,500 |
4 |
2,400 |
1 |
19,988 |
6 |
| Canada |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
10,834 |
0 |
2,850 |
0.5 |
24,772 |
1.5 |
| Iceland |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
6,500 |
4 |
2,400 |
1 |
19,988 |
6 |
| Japan |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
10,834 |
0 |
3,000 |
0 |
24,922 |
1 |
| New Zealand |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
5,417 |
5 |
2,400 |
1 |
18,905 |
7 |
| Norway |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
2,167 |
8 |
2,400 |
1 |
15,655 |
10 |
| United States |
5,382 |
0 |
5,706 |
1 |
6,500 |
4 |
1,800 |
4 |
19,388 |
9 |
ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP |
| Korea |
538 |
9 |
3,804 |
4 |
3,250 |
7 |
900 |
7 |
8,492 |
37 |
| Switzerland |
538 |
9 |
4,438 |
3 |
3,250 |
7 |
300 |
9 |
8,526 |
38 |
OTHER |
| Poland |
3,767 |
3 |
1,268 |
8 |
2,167 |
8 |
2,100 |
3 |
9,302 |
22 |
| Hungary |
3,229 |
3 |
1,268 |
8 |
5,417 |
5 |
2,400 |
2 |
12,314 |
18 |
| Czech Republic |
3,229 |
3 |
1,268 |
8 |
5,417 |
5 |
2,100 |
3 |
12,014 |
19 |
THE LOOPHOLESLOOPHOLE NO.1:
OVERSELLING
Article 17 of the Kyoto
Protocol states that the CoP will define the "principles, modalities, rules and
guidelines" for emissions trading and that Annex B Parties can participate in
emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments. Article 3 states that
parts of Parties assigned amounts will be added or subtracted when Parties trade
under Article 17. Beyond this, the rules of emissions trading are undefined. The units
traded under emissions trading are referred to as assigned amount units ("AAUs")
or parts of assigned amount.
If poorly designed, trading can create incentives for Parties not to comply. There is a
risk that Parties will "over-sell" i.e. they will sell emission quotas
(i.e. assigned amount units or AAUs) ultimately needed to cover their emissions. If other
Parties use these non-surplus AAUs to increase their emissions, emissions trading
multiplies the negative environmental impact of one nations non-compliance.
LOOPHOLE POTENTIAL RATING
The highest risk of
overselling is likely from those nations the former Soviet Union and eastern Europe
where the transition to a market economy has been jarring, where there is a
desperate need for foreign currency, and where there has been a breakdown in the
institutions best able to guard against overselling. Under a worst case scenario, Russia
and the Ukraine alone could sell their entire assigned amount without shifting their
emissions pattern. This would allow a 13,456 megatonne (CO2 eq.) increase in global
emissions over what would occur in the absence of overselling (a sixteen percent increase
in Annex B emissions relative to the Kyoto Protocol without any loopholes). While this is
an extreme case, it is plausible under some liability systems. However, because 100%
overselling is an extreme case the 13,456 m.t. for overselling is discounted by 60%. The
maximum loophole points for ineffective systems to avoid overselling is 5,382.
SCORE FACTORS
| Position could allow 100%
overselling |
0/10
|
| Position eliminates risk of
overselling |
9/10
|
| Position has questionable
effectiveness in eliminating overselling |
3/10
|
PARTY POSITION RATINGS
Umbrella Group
Umbrella Group members have supported a system of Originating
Party Liability (also known as seller liability or issuer liability). All AAUs are valid
and will not be discounted or invalidated even if the Party who initially sells them (the
Originating Party) grossly exceeds its assigned amount. The compliance system is used to
discourage overselling. From an environmental perspective the Umbrella Group proposal is
deeply flawed:
Entails high risk of gross overselling. Under
Umbrella Group proposals, Parties could sell their entire assigned amount while allowing
emissions to increase.
Contemplated enforcement consequences not sufficient to restrain overselling. Domestic trading systems using Originating Party Liability systems
have worked well where the full force of the state can be brought to bear on
non-compliers. In contrast, the compliance consequences being contemplated by the Parties
are weak: some Parties are resisting having any binding consequences; other Parties have
suggested that the main consequence of non-compliance be a requirement to offset the
overage in subsequent commitment periods. Indeed, in the absence of trade sanctions (a
consequence no Party is advocating), there is no means of forcing a Party to comply.
Enforcement under international law is unlikely to ever approach the rigor of effective
domestic programs that use Originating Party Liability.
Recent experience suggests Parties will over-sell if it is profitable. Recent IMF loans to Russia were conditioned on government adopting
measures that involved short-term costs. After receipt of the loans, Russia immediately
reneged on the commitments. This occurred despite the fact that it would likely jeopardise
future loans from the IMF.
The Umbrella Group continues to actively promote originating party liability.
SCORE: 0/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-0)/10) x 5,382 = 5,382
European Union
The EU has recently suggested a mixed liability approach to
avoid overselling. This appears to be the EUs preferred option, replacing three
earlier options. Under the EU approach:
- AAUs which have been transferred from a Party that is out of compliance would be
temporarily invalidated on a "Last in/First Out" basis i.e. AAUs
originating from a non-complying nation would be invalidated in a number equal to the
amount of excess emissions; invalidation would start with the most recently transferred
AAUs.
- The seller of the AAUs will remain responsible for the entirety of its excess emissions
and faces consequences for the breach of its Article 3.1 commitments.
- The purchaser can only use the temporarily invalidated AAUs for purposes of compliance
once the compliance body deems that the transferring Party has remedied the
non-compliance.
Under the EU system, AAUs from Parties that are on track to compliance are likely to be
sold at a premium. This will encourage quick compliance with reporting requirements and
encourage strong, transparent measures to reduce emissions.
Modelling* shows that a similar user liability system achieves full compliance but with
a twenty percent increment in costs. The modelling results may, however, be partly a
result of the modelling assuming compliance by buyers. There is a risk that buyer
liability allows overselling but simply transfers the obligation to reduce emissions onto
the selling party. This and the cost implications of mixed liability in the future could
reduce willingness to accept more stringent targets in the future. Because other options
are available with comparable environmental integrity and lower costs, the EU approach is
not given full marks.
SCORE: 8/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-8)/10) x 5,382 = 1,076
Switzerland
Under the Swiss proposal, Parties designate an "annual
allocation plan". Allocation plans set out how much of their assigned amount
will be used in each year of the commitment period. The AAUs allocated to any particular
year cannot be more than five percent higher than the average for all years in the period.
Parties can only sell AAUs if their cumulative annual allocation is greater than
cumulative emissions for the most recent comparable period. The Swiss proposal:
- Substantially reduces the potential for overselling (as compared to Originating
Party Liability). Modelling* suggests that the Swiss
Proposal would limit non-compliance to several percentage points and could possibly
encourage over-compliance. (In comparison, Originating Party Liability could allow 100%
non-compliance by net sellers).
- Reduces compliance costs (as compared to Buyer Liability) by allowing Parties to
purchase AAUs on an Originating Party Liability basis. Modelling* suggests that the
Swiss Proposal would, relative to full compliance and no restrictions on trading, increase
compliance costs slightly for net-buyers.
- Allows marginal overselling. Parties could "front-load" their annual
allocation plan by projecting unrealistic emission reductions in later years. A Party
projecting these reductions in their allocation plan may be able to sell and certify a
significant number of AAUs in early years, even though these are needed when the
reductions are not achieved.
SCORE: 9/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-9)/10) x 5,382 = 538
Korea
Korea has been largely silent on the issue of overselling,
although the Chair of the Mechanisms Group, a Korean, has proposed text on overselling
that uses a commitment period reserve to avoid overselling. The Koreans are assumed to
support the Chairs position or that of their Environmental Integrity Group partner,
Switzerland.
SCORE: 9/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-9)/10) x 5,382 = 538
Czech Republic/Hungary
The Czech Republic and Hungary supported earlier EU proposals
on liability systems, but not the EUs latest proposal for a mixed liability system.
The earlier EU proposal involved three options:
Shared Liability. Under the shared liability option,
a portion of AAUs transferred to another Party is invalidated if the seller has excess
emissions (i.e. emissions exceed the number of AAUs it holds). The portion invalidated is
a multiple of the percentage by which a Party exceeds its assigned amount. The EU proposal
could invalidate a portion of AAUs that is either much smaller or much larger than the
overage of the selling Party. In some cases, this could make the system ineffective in
discouraging over-selling.
Trigger. Under the "trigger" option, sales
proceed on an Originating Party Liability basis until a question is raised as to
compliance of the seller with its Article 3 commitments. Sales after that point proceed on
basis that the AAUs may be invalidated if the seller is eventually found to be out of
compliance with its commitments. This option is not necessarily more environmentally
effective than Originating Party Liability. Although the EU does not define what it means
by "a question is raised," questions as to compliance with Article 3 are
unlikely to be raised until after the end of the Commitment Period. A Party could thus
sell all AAUs prior to questions being raised.
Compliance Reserve. Under the proposal for a
compliance reserve, a percentage (suggestions range from 10% to 2000%) of net AAU sales
are put into a compliance reserve account. At the end of the Commitment Period, if a Party
is out of compliance, AAUs held in the reserve are used to reduce or eliminate the
overage. If the Party is in compliance, it could sell or bank AAUs from the reserve. This
proposal is unlikely to be environmentally effective and would add to costs of compliance.
Whether or not this approach is environmentally effective depends on choosing the correct
specified percentage. A different reserve requirement would be needed for each Party that
will be a net seller. It would be difficult or impossible to determine optimal reserve
requirement in advance.
These two Parties have been silent on the issue of overselling in recent negotiations,
and it is not clear whether they continue to support the above options. The score is based
on the questionable effectiveness of these approaches with a slight discount to reflect
that they are not actively supporting them now.
SCORE: 3/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-3)/10) x 5,382 = 3,767
Poland
Poland has proposed placing a percentage of net AAU sales into a compliance
reserve account. Three percent would be set aside for sales that appear to be surplus
given projected emissions; twenty percent would be set aside for sales that are not
surplus. Like the other proposals for a compliance reserve, this is unlikely to be fully
effective, although it would reduce the size of the loophole.
SCORE: 3/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-3)/10) x 5,382 = 3,767
LOOPHOLE NO.2: HOT AIR
Hot air is the excess of
Parties individual assigned amounts over their projected emissions for the 2008 to
2012 period. Currently, the Parties of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are the
primary holders of hot air. The amount from Russia and Eastern Europe is substantial
because assigned amounts of the largest emitters of the former Soviet Bloc are based on
emitting at 100% of 1990 levels, but emissions have collapsed due to economic decline.
Ukraines emissions declined by 50.5% between 1990 and 1998, Russias by 35.4%,
and Latvias by 67.7%. If Russia and other economies in transition are allowed to
trade hot air, the result will be an increase in emissions compared to if there was no
emissions trading.
LOOPHOLE POTENTIAL RATING
West Coast Environmental Law estimates that there is potentially 1268 mt. CO2 eq. of
hot air per year available for trade (6,340 m.t. over the Commitment Period.). This is
based on US Energy Information Agency (US EIA) year 2000 projections for carbon dioxide
emissions and Russian and Ukranian projections for methane and nitrous oxide emissions. It
is equal to 7% of Annex B 1990 emissions. While this estimate of hot air is rough and
dependant on eastern European economic performance over the next decade, it is believed to
be more accurate than earlier, somewhat lower, estimates.
SCORE FACTORS
| Formula for Eliminating Hot Air |
Proportional to
effectiveness to a maximum of 10 points |
| Supports principle of trading not
increasing emissions (but no formula). |
1 point |
| Not opposed to mechanism to
eliminate hot air (but no formula) |
2 points |
| Early Start to JI to draw down Hot
Air (but no formula for hot air) |
1 point |
PARTY POSITION RATINGS
EU, Poland, Czech Republic
and Hungary
These Parties position on hot air is as follows:
- Limit net sales of AAUs and ERUs. The EU has suggested restricting sales of AAUs
and ERUs based on a formula. The formula would limit sales to between four and five
percent of Parties assigned amounts.
- Allow increased sales to the extent a Party can demonstrate that the reductions are due
to domestic action taken after 1993.
The EU position would eliminate up to 80% of hot air (based on US EIA estimates of hot
air from the Former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe), but could be less effective
depending on the ease or difficulty of demonstrating that reductions are due to domestic
action.
SCORE: 8/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-8))/10) x 6,340 = 1,268
Umbrella Group
The Umbrella Group opposes any restrictions on hot air
trading. The Umbrella Group has supported an early start to joint implementation, which
could provide some minor mitigation of hot air.
SCORE: 1/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-1))/10) x 6,340 = 5,706
Switzerland
Switzerland proposed early start to JI to draw down hot air.
Beyond this Switzerland has been silent on the issue of hot air. It has not opposed
restrictions on hot air sales.
SCORE: 3/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-3))/10) x 6,340 = 4,438
Korea
Korea has supported the principle of climate change effectiveness for emissions trading
and has supported objective criteria to prevent hot air. It has been silent on specifics.
SCORE: 4/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-4))/10) x 6,340 = 3,804
|
LOOPHOLE NO.3: SINKS
The assigned amount of most countries is a percentage of
"gross" emissions in 1990. Gross emissions are anthropogenic emissions of
greenhouse gas emissions from energy, industrial processes, agriculture and waste. For
most parties, assigned amounts do not reflect whether forest, soils and other carbon
reservoirs are removing carbon from the atmosphere (i.e. acting as a sink) or acting as a
source of greenhouse gases. However, when calculating whether a Party is in compliance
with its Article 3 emission limits, Parties are required to count some but not all carbon
fluxes from forests. Article 3.3 provides that a nation will be credited with any
increase, or debited for any decrease, in sequestered carbon in the period 2008 to 2012
due to afforestation, reforestation or deforestation since 1990. Article 3.4 provides a
mechanism for adding other activities into the carbon accounting system. There are a
number of issues associated with credit for sinks: including uncertainty of sink
estimates, permanence, credit for natural sequestration and credit for business as usual
activities.
LOOPHOLE POTENTIAL RATING
Adding activities under Article 3.4 will increase
emissions if credit for business as usual activities. For the 2008 to 2012 time period,
almost all Parties are projecting that their land use, land use change and forestry sector
(the "LULUCF" sector) will be a net sink. West Coast Environmental Law estimates
that Annex B Parties net sequestration is equal to 10,834 megatonnes.
SCORE FACTORS
| Exclusion of additional sinks under
3.4 during First Commitment Period |
10/10 |
| Explicit exclusion of additional
activities in FCP except with combination of discounts, thresholds, activity selection, |
Proportional to
stringency of approach to a maximum of 9 |
| Silent on addition of new
activities. |
5/10 |
| Addition of Narrow Activities with
no discussion of thresholds or discounts |
4/10 |
| Comprehensive Inclusion in First
Commitment Period with undefined threshold of discount |
4/10 |
| Comprehensive Inclusion in First
Commitment Period without discount. |
0/10 |
PARTY POSITION RATING
Canada
Canada supports tonne for tonne credit for all net
sequestration from managed forestland or agricultural land. Canada has opposed attempts to
establish thresholds that separate natural or business as usual sequestration from human
induced enhancements to sequestration.
SCORE: 0/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-0)/10) x 10,834 = 10,834
United States
The United states position supports comprehensive
credit for carbon sequestration, but given the potential size of the loophole has
suggested a discount on credits during the First Commitment Period or limiting credit to
sequestration that exceeds a particular threshold. The US has not provided detailed
proposals.
SCORE: 4/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-4)/10) x 10,834 = 6,500
Australia
Australia has proposed allowing, under Article 3.4,
credit for all sequestration on areas of land where human induced additional
activities" have occurred since 1990. Australia proposes specifying relatively narrow
categories of "human induced additional activities". The only such activity
specified by Australia is re-vegetation. According to Australias submission., this
would increase Australias assigned amount by 1.5%; however, the Australian
NGOs estimate that it would give Australia 100 mega-tonnes credit for business as
usual sequestration. Australia does not make any reference to concerns that Parties may
choose additional activities that give them the greatest credit under their national
circumstances.
SCORE: 4/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-4)/10) x 10,834 = 6,500
Iceland
Icelands position is similar to that of
Australia.
SCORE: 4/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-4)/10) x 10,834 = 6,500
Japan
Japan has proposed an approach to sinks equivalent to
Canada.
SCORE: 0/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-0)/10) x 10,834 = 10,834
New Zealand
New Zealand receives a huge amount of credit under
Article 3.3. New Zealand has not proposed adding any additional activities under Article
3.4, although its submission clearly contemplates adding new activities.
SCORE: 5/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-5)/10) x 10,834 = 5,417
Norway
Norway has stated that parties should anticipate
clearly limited credit from additional activities under Article 3.4 for the first
commitment period. Norway has suggested adding activities analogous to afforestation since
1990, e.g. re-vegetation since 1990. Norway has suggested baselines or thresholds are
appropriate for factoring out business as usual activities. It has not called for any
discounting to reflect issues of permanence or uncertainty.
SCORE: 8/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-8)/10) x 10,834 = 2,167
Poland
Polands position on sinks is unclear, but its
statements suggest opposition to addition of new activities under Article 3.4 for the
First Commitment Period.
SCORE: 8/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-8)/10) x 10,834 = 2,167
Hungary and Czech Republic
Hungary and Czech Republic have been silent on the
issue of additions to 3.4.
SCORE: 5/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-5)/10) x 10,834 = 5,417
Switzerland and Korea
Switzerland had proposed land based full carbon
accounting in the long term, but has called for negotiation of thresholds to separate
natural or business as usual sequestration from human-induced effects. It has not called
for any discounting to reflect issues of permanence or uncertainty.
SCORE: 7/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-7)/10) x 10,834 = 3,250
European Union
The European Union has promoted adding no new
activities under Article 3.4 during the First Commitment Period except if COP decides that
the issues of scale, uncertainty and risk are resolved. It has proposed that priority be
given to emission reductions when deciding what activities to add under Article 3.4. It
has suggested using a combination of the following approaches:
- discounting for uncertainty;
- adding only narrow classes of additional activities and crediting only detectable human
induced effects on carbon stocks;
- discounting activities by 95% in the first commitment period;
- limiting credit to 1% of assigned amount;
- only crediting carbon stock changes that exceed a threshold; and
- strict separation of credit from natural levels of sequestration and human induce
effects.
Although the EU approach could effectively eliminate any loopholes, certain options are
less effective. The one- percent cap on increases to assigned amount would allow an 866
megatonne increase in emissions. The 95% discount could allow 541 m.t. increase in
emission if applied to a broad range of activities.
SCORE: 9/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-9)/10) x 10,834 = 1,083
LOOPHOLE NO. 4: ELIGIBILITY AND BASELINES UNDER THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT
MECHANISM
Annex B Parties can use Certified Emission Reductions (CERs)
generated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to meet their emission reduction
targets. Projects that qualify for the CDM generate CERs by reducing emissions below a
baseline that represents what would have occurred in the absence of the project or absence
of the CDM. Since it is impossible to know exactly what would have occurred in the absence
of the CDM, there is a risk that CERs will represent either emission reductions that are
not real or emission reductions that would have occurred anyway.
If the CDM simply certifies emission reductions from projects that would have occurred
without Annex B commitments i.e. if it certifies business as usual improvements in
technology it will reduce the effectiveness of Annex B commitments. To avoid
weakening the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol, the volume of CERs generated by the CDM
must be no greater than the number of emission reductions that are caused by the CDM.
The debate over baseline setting is largely a debate over the concept of additionality.
A number of terms are used often inconsistently:
- Program Additionality (or simply "Additionality")
. The project or reduction would not have occurred in the absence of the
CDM (or it would have occurred later). Indicators of program additionality include:
- Regulatory Additionality. Has the project been directly or indirectly mandated by law or
regulation?
- Investment Additionality. Would the project have occurred under the investing
partys normal investment decision rules and in the absence of any value assigned to
emission reductions?
- Technological Additionality. Does the project involve technology or practices that go
beyond conventional practice in a sector and geographic area?
- Emissions or Environmental Additionality
. Reductions
are additional to what would occur without the project. Environmental additionality is an
important issue. However, if the CDM certifies reductions that are environmentally
additional but not program additional i.e. if it certifies business as usual
improvements in technology that would have occurred in the absence of Annex B commitments
it will reduce the effectiveness of Annex B commitments.
- Financial Additionality
. Public funding for a CDM
project is in addition to existing financial commitments of Annex II Parties or in
addition to existing development assistance flows.
Whether rules for baseline setting and eligibility of projects for the CDM accurately
estimate program additional emission reductions will depend on the details of the rules,
the size of the CDM market and how markets react to CDM incentives. If demand for CERs is
low and the incentives created by the CDM only lead to marginal shifts in technologies,
there is a high risk of overestimating emission reductions, potentially by an order of
magnitude. A number of factors suggest that overestimating additional emission reductions
is a greater risk:
- Transaction costs and adaptation fees associated with the CDM are likely to reduce CDM
competitiveness relative to emissions trading.
- Credit for non-additional activities (hot air and sinks) could minimize demand for the
CDM.
- Incentives generally transform the most efficient aspect of the market. Investors who
are already investing in relatively efficient technologies and practices due to
sophistication and access to capital and technology are best poised to use the CDM.
Given these factors, a conservative approach is warranted. A conservative approach
would set baselines on the basis of better than average current practices. It would also
call for development of guidelines on baseline setting methodology. Such guidance is
important for ensuring consistency in the development of baselines. Mere oversight by the
Executive Board is likely to prove ineffective, as at is a political agency that may, in
the absence of technical guidance, have difficulty rejecting weak project baseline
methodologies.
LOOPHOLE POTENTIAL RATING
Credits from non-additional emission reductions and
unrealistic baselines are virtually unlimited. If only a fifth of CDM credits are for
business as usual reductions, and if the CDM market is as large as projected (3,092
megatonnes of CO2 reduction credits per year), the CDM could allow an increase
in emissions of over 3,000 megatonnes during the First Commitment Period.
SCORE FACTORS
Party Scores are based on the following:
| No opposition to need for
additionality tests and stringent baselines? |
1 point |
| Has the Party acknowledged the need
for program additionality? |
1 point |
| Has the Party supported thresholds
to exclude non-additional projects? |
1 point |
| Has the Party suggested restrictions
on project eligibility with the intention of excluding types of projects that tend to be
non-program additional? |
2 points |
| No opposition to CDM Manual with
Technical Guidance |
1point |
| Has the Party supported a CDM Manual
of CDM Handbook that gives technical guidance on setting of baselines? |
1 point |
| Has the Party suggested baselines
that represent at least average practice? |
1 point |
| Has the Party suggested baselines
that represent better than average practice? |
2 points |
PARTY BY PARTY RATINGS
European Union
Project Eligibility and Additionality: The EU has proposed several mechanisms that would help ensure CDM
projects are program additional. First of all, the EU has promoted initially restricting
the CDM to renewable and energy efficiency projects.
Although they have rejected strict investment and technological additionality tests,
The EU has said that projects must not be business as usual but has said that they must
represent the best environmentally safe and sound technology. They have also suggested
that the executive board have the power to audit decisions of operational entities and, to
reject projects that would have been done anyway in the absence of the CDM. The EU has
also promoted rigorous socio-economic impact assessments for CDM projects.
CDM Handbook: The
EU along with the Czech Republic and Poland has suggested the need for a CDM reference
Manual that provides technical guidance on baseline setting. Baselines must or
methodologies used for baselines must be compatible with the Guidelines. The European
Union alone has suggested the need for IPCC advise on baseline methodologies.
Baselines: The EU
has also promoted draft decision language on baselines that is relatively stringent. In
particular they have suggested that baselines represent the lowest of:
- Existing actual emissions prior to the project (for retrofits only)
- Most reasonable technology which represents an economic course of action;
- Better than average current industry practice in the host country or an appropriate
region.
Multi-project baselines are to be even more conservative with baselines representing
trends in emission rates, and where there are several better than average current
practices, the lowest emission rate is to be chosen.
SCORE: 9/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-9)/10) x 3,000 = 300
Poland and Czech Republic
Poland and the Czechs have supported calls for additional
technical guidance on baselines in a CDM Manual.
They have not opposed additionality tests.
SCORE: 3/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-3)/10) x 3,000 = 2,100
Hungary
Hungary has been silent on all CDM issues.
SCORE: 2/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-2)/10) x 3,000 = 2,400
Umbrella Group (Other than US, Japan and Canada)
Project Eligibility and Additionality: The Umbrella Group has promoted no restrictions on the types of
project that would qualify for the CDM. As a whole the group has not made any statements
on the need for an additionality screen.
CDM Handbook: The
Umbrella Group has rejected the need for a reference manual or handbook that provides
technical guidance on development of baselines. Instead it has suggested that first of a
kind methodologies for baseline setting shall be subject to approval by the Executive
Board of the CDM. Moreover, the purpose of the reference manual is facilitating
development of baselines and enhancing transparency of baselines. Notably absent from the
proposed purposes of the reference manual is ensuring environmental integrity of
baselines. The reference manual is only to include methodologies approved by the Executive
Board and such other guidance that will facilitate and enhance transparency in the
development of baselines. This approach (relying on operational entities and the oversight
of the Executive Board to ensuring effective baselines) is highly problematic given the
lack of guidance on key issues such as determination of additionality.
Baselines: The
Umbrella Group has not made any statements on means for setting baselines, other than that
they be approved by operational entities and that first of a kind methodologies be
approved by the Executive Board. This, in combination with the lack of technical guidance
in the CDM handbook, creates a potential for emission reductions that are exaggerated
through use of baselines that reflect worst emission case scenarios.
The Umbrella Group as a whole has not opposed the need for some thresholds or tests to
determine program additionality.
SCORE: 1/10 (FOR UMBRELLA GROUP MEMBERS OTHER THAN
THOSE LISTED BELOW)
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-1)/10) x 3,000 = 2,700
United States
Project Eligibility and Additionality: The US has supported Umbrella Group submissions on baselines, but has
clearly acknowledged the importance of program additionality, stressing the importance of
an effective test for whether reductions are additional to what would have occurred in the
absence of CDM incentives. The US has proposed limiting CDM eligibility to projects with a
level of performance that is significantly better than average compared to a reference
scenario. The reference scenario consists of recent and comparable activities or
facilities in a relevant geographic area. The relevant geographic area would be the host
country or possibly smaller or larger regions.
Whether performance is "significantly better than average" is determined by
applying methodologies approved by the executive board of the CDM. The US narrative text
suggests that the "significantly better than average" threshold be determined by
reference to a particular percentile of performance. For instance, a new kraft pulp mill
in China might only qualify for the CDM if its emissions rate exceeds the 75th
percentile (ranked from worst to lowest emission rates) of recently installed kraft
pulping capacity in China.
Baselines: If the
eligibility threshold is met, draft decision language proposed by the US refers to
baselines representing what would occur in the absence of the project. The US has proposed
setting baselines by reference to weighted average performance level for recent,
comparable projects (weighted average means that a facility with larger production is
given more weight). Comparable projects would be projects using the same fuel type.
The US approach is relatively clear in its operation. However, it is less conservative
than options promoted by Switzerland, Korea and a number of other countries. Because
baselines are based on projects using the same fuel type, there is a risk that the US
approach could create an incentive for projects that use carbon intensive fuels.
SCORE: 4/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-4/10)) x 3,000 = 1,800
Canada
Canada is a Party to Umbrella Group submissions, but Canada
has focused on the difficulties in implementing any form of additionality other than
emissions additionality. Canada has not explicitly rejected program additionality, but it
has not provided any constructive suggestions for setting baselines or establishing
project eligibility criteria.
SCORE: 0.5/10:
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-0.5)/10) x 3,000 = 2,850
Japan
Japan is a Party to Umbrella Group submissions, but Japan has
rejected any test other than environmental additionality, especially rejecting financial
additionality.
SCORE: 0/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-0)/10) x 3,000 = 3,000
Korea
Eligibility and thresholds: Korea promotes restricting projects to renewable energy projects and
energy efficiency and has taken a strong stance on the need for program additionality. It
has suggested a strict investment additionality criteria, technological additionality
assessment and financial additionality assessment.
CDM Handbook:
Korea has supported the need for a technical CDM manual on baseline issues. Korea
recognizes the need for technical elaboration of guidelines.
Baselines: Korea
has shown support for stringent baselines by suggesting amendments to negotiation language
that would allow additionality to be based on better than average (as opposed to average)
practices in the OECD.
SCORE: 7/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-7)/10) x 3,000 = 900
Switzerland
Eligibility: Switzerland
has suggested listing eligible project types based on their additionality and consistency
with sustainable development criteria. The Swiss have also supported rigorous, public
socio-impact assessments for CDM projects.
CDM Handbook:
Switzerland has proposed guidelines on information that would need to be presented with a
project in order to have a baseline approved. Switzerland has focused on the need for
baselines that reflect better than average current practice. Switzerland has recommended
development of a detailed Baseline Reference Manual with more relatively comprehensive
guidance than suggested in EU submissions. For instance, the Swiss guidance document would
include standard leakage correction factors and baseline safety margins
Baselines:
Switzerland has supported baselines being set on reasonable better than average practices.
SCORE: 9/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-9)/10) x 3,000 = 300
COP6 UPDATE ON PARTY SCORES At the first meeting on the treatment of sinks at
The Hague, several Parties elaborated their positions on sinks or changed their positions
on sinks. These developments lead to new scores for Canada, the United States, Japan and
New Zealand. The Canadian and Japanese scores improved marginally from 0/10 to 2/10. The
US score declined from 4/10 to 2/10. The New Zealand score improved to 6/10.
The US ranking changed from fifth worst to third worst. Canada and Japans ranking
remained the same (second worst and worst, respectively). New Zealands ranking was
unchanged.
PARTY POSITION RATING
Canada, US and Japan
Prior to CoP6, Canada and Japan supported 100%, tonne
for tonne credit, for all net sequestration from managed forestland or agricultural land.
Canada has opposed attempts to establish thresholds that separate natural or business as
usual sequestration from human induced enhancements to sequestration. This position was
given a score of 0/10 in the initial draft of this paper.
The US had called for comprehensive credit from managed forestland or agricultural
land, but had recognized the need for discounts or thresholds to deal with the problem of
credit from business as usual. The Us had been given a score of 4/10.
At CoP6, all these Parties changed their positions. In a joint submission, the US and
Canada, supported by Japan, proposed that Parties receive 100% credit for all net carbon
sequestration (i.e. absorption) from activities other than forest management (e.g.
agricultural soil management, shelterbelts, re-vegetation).
For forest management, Parties would receive 100% credit for all net carbon
sequestration up to a maximum "initial interval". The maximum of 100% credit for
net sequestration in the initial interval would be the lower of a fixed tonne value or a
fixed percent of 1990 emissions.
The Party would receive discounted credit for all tonnes of net sequestration above the
initial interval but lower than a threshold. The threshold would be based on historic
(19951998) levels of carbon sequestration from forest management, although it might
be reduced for Parties that have declining business as usual sequestration levels.
Over the threshold, Parties would receive 100% credit.
Key points in relation to this proposal:
- It is possible that a country could receive 100% for all of its sequestration. If the
initial interval is set at an absolute level or a percent of 1990 emissions, while the
threshold is set at historic or business as usual levels, the threshold could be less than
the initial interval. All net sequestration (both business as usual and additional) would
receive 100% credit.
- The discount might apply only to the US and Russia. The forest management sink in these
two countries is huge far larger than any other Party.
- The initial interval has no logical basis.
- Basing the threshold on 1995 to 1998 emissions is inconsistent with the Protocol and
UNFCCC (both of which use a 1990 baseline). It will tend to make it easier to generate
credit for Parties with declining levels of sequestration.
- Without specific figures for the discount rate and initial interval, it is impossible to
know how much credit is given for business as usual.
- 100% credit for net sequestration from re-vegetation, agricultural soils, shelterbelts,
etc. could involve a significant amount of credit for business as usual sequestration.
Australias business as usual sequestration for re-vegetation alone is estimated at
up to 100 megatonnes.
- The proposal represents a minor improvement on Canada and Japans positions as it
recognizes the need to discount.
- The proposal represents a worsening of the US position, as it allows for some countries
receiving undiscounted credit for all their business as usual sequestration.
SCORE: 2/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-2)/10) x 10,834 = 8,667
New Zealand
New Zealand receives a huge amount of credit under Article
3.3. New Zealand has not proposed adding any additional activities under Article 3.4.
Although its submission clearly contemplates adding new activities, at COP 6 New Zealand
stated that no credit should be given for business as usual under 3.4.
SCORE: 6/10
LOOPHOLE MEGATONNES: ((10-6)/10) x 10,834 = 4,334
TABLE 2 (UPDATED TO REFLECT CHANGES IN POSITION AT COP6)
NATION\ISSUE |
OVERSELLING |
HOT AIR |
SINKS |
CDM BASELINES |
TOTAL LOOPHOLE
MEGATONNES |
| EUROPEAN UNION |
| Austria |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Belgium |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Denmark |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Finland |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| France |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Germany |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Greece |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Ireland |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Italy |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Luxembourg |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Netherlands |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Portugal |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Spain |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| Sweden |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| United Kingdom |
1,076 |
1,268 |
1,083 |
300 |
3,727 |
| UMBRELLA GROUP |
| Australia |
5,382 |
5,706 |
6,500 |
2,400 |
19,988 |
| Canada |
5,382 |
5,706 |
8,667 |
2,850 |
22,605 |
| Iceland |
5,382 |
5,706 |
6,500 |
2,400 |
19,988 |
| Japan |
5,382 |
5,706 |
8,667 |
3,000 |
22,755 |
| New Zealand |
5,382 |
5,706 |
4,334 |
2,400 |
17,822 |
| Norway |
5,382 |
5,706 |
2,167 |
2,400 |
15,655 |
| United States |
5,382 |
5,706 |
8,667 |
1,800 |
21,555 |
| ENVIRONMENTAL INTEGRITY GROUP |
| Korea |
538 |
3,804 |
3,250 |
900 |
8,492 |
| Switzerland |
538 |
4,438 |
3,250 |
300 |
8,526 |
| OTHER |
| Poland |
3,767 |
1,268 |
2,167 |
2,100 |
9,302 |
| Hungary |
3,229 |
1,268 |
5,417 |
2,400 |
12,314 |
| Czech Republic |
3,229 |
1,268 |
5,417 |
2,100 |
12,014 |
UPDATED TABLE 1 TO REFLECT NEW POSITIONS ON SINKS
Rank |
NATION |
TOTAL LOOPHOLE
MEGATONNES |
1.
|
Austria
|
3,727 |
2.
|
Belgium
|
3,727 |
3.
|
Denmark
|
3,727 |
4.
|
Finland
|
3,727 |
5.
|
France
|
3,727 |
6.
|
Germany
|
3,727 |
7.
|
Greece
|
3,727 |
8.
|
Ireland
|
3,727 |
9.
|
Italy
|
3,727 |
10.
|
Luxembourg
|
3,727 |
11.
|
Netherlands
|
3,727 |
12.
|
Portugal
|
3,727 |
13.
|
Spain
|
3,727 |
14.
|
Sweden
|
3,727 |
15.
|
United Kingdom
|
3,727 |
16.
|
Korea
|
8,492 |
17.
|
Switzerland
|
8,526 |
18.
|
Poland
|
9,302 |
19.
|
Hungary
|
12,314 |
20.
|
Czech Republic
|
12,014 |
21.
|
Norway
|
15,655 |
22.
|
New Zealand
|
17,822 |
23.
|
Iceland
|
19,988 |
24.
|
Australia
|
19,988 |
25.
|
United States
|
21,555 |
26.
|
Canada
|
22,605 |
27.
|
Japan
|
22,755 |
|
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